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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 




JOHN G. COSTINO, 
Appellant 
v. 
POLICE OFFICER TONYA ANDERSON; SPECIAL AGENT MARGARITA  
ABBATTISCIANNI; MATTHEW D. WEINTRAUB, Cape May County Assistant  
Prosecutor; MEGHAN HOERNER, Cape May County Assistant Prosecutor;  
DETECTIVE GEORGE HALLETT; LIEUTENANT DETECTIVE LYNN FRAME;  
TINA KELL, Cape May County Assistant Prosecutor; ROBERT L. TAYLOR, Cape May 
County Prosecutor; CAPE MAY COUNTY; LITTLE EGG HARBOR TOWNSHIP 
_______________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 1-14-cv-06940) 
District Judge: Honorable Joseph H. Rodriguez 
_______________ 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  
On September 12, 2019 
Before: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and BIBAS, Circuit Judges. 




                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding 
precedent.  
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BIBAS, Circuit Judge.  
Not every failed prosecution is a malicious one. After an undercover sting operation, 
two grand juries indicted former doctor John Costino. There was evidence that he had been 
prescribing opioids illegally, but a jury acquitted him on all counts. Costino now claims 
that the investigators maliciously made up evidence against him to convince those grand 
juries that there was probable cause. But the facts say otherwise.  
The most Costino can show is that the investigators failed to present some arguably 
favorable evidence to the grand juries. But they had no obligation to do so. So we will 
affirm.  
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The investigation 
For decades, Costino ran a successful medical practice in North Wildwood, New Jersey. 
Because he was the only pain-management doctor in the area, he prescribed a lot of opioids. 
But investigators from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Cape May 
County, New Jersey, suspected that he might be prescribing some painkillers illegally.  
To test their suspicions, they sent Tonya Anderson, a local New Jersey police officer, 
to Costino’s clinic. Anderson went in undercover, with a recording device and transmitter 
in her purse, posing as a stripper. She asked him for Percocet, a popular painkiller, not 
because she was sore or in pain but just to “unwind after work” and “relax[ ].” App. 76a, 
244a. Costino observed her gait as she walked in and questioned her briefly, but he did not 
otherwise examine her muscles or bones. Still, he diagnosed her with a musculoskeletal 
injury. Before she left, she signed Costino’s boilerplate Pain Management Agreement.  
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Over the next few months, Costino prescribed Percocet to Anderson five times, even 
though he noted that she was “basically a healthy gal.” App. 79a. And when she wanted a 
stronger, longer-lasting drug, he increased her prescription’s strength. He did so even 
though Anderson said she had “[n]o problems at all.” App. 84a. 
To be safe, the investigators wanted more evidence. So they sent an undercover DEA 
agent, posing as another stripper, with Anderson to Costino’s clinic. When Costino asked 
the agent why she needed Percocet, she replied: “[I]t’s basically the same as Tonya here.” 
App. 140a. After a night of stripping, she “need[ed] something to just bring [her] down a 
little bit during the day.” Id. She told Costino that she was “one hundred percent healthy” 
and “fe[lt] good.” App. 152a–54a. Even so, Costino wrote both women prescriptions for 
thirty Percocets. Three weeks later, the women told him they were going to Florida for a 
few months, so he wrote each of them another prescription for twice as many pills because 
Florida “ha[s] a lot of rules and regulations” governing painkillers. App. 173a–75a. 
B. The criminal trial and acquittal 
After the undercover investigation, Cape May County Detective George Hallett got a 
warrant to search Costino’s clinic. Hallett searched the clinic and arrested Costino.  
Cape May County prosecutors then took over the case. They presented the evidence 
gathered by Hallett, Anderson, the DEA agent, and others to two grand juries. Both indicted 
Costino on dozens of counts of healthcare fraud and illegal distribution of opioids.  
Before trial, the New Jersey Board of Medical Examiners held hearings to revoke 
Costino’s medical license. At those hearings, Anderson certified that while Costino was 
prescribing her Percocet, she did not have any medical issues with her spine. But Anderson 
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did have one chiropractic appointment around that time for back and shoulder pain. When 
Costino discovered this discrepancy, Anderson submitted a second, corrected certification 
noting the chiropractic appointment. She explained that she did not disclose the treatment 
at first because she saw it as “holistic” rather than “medical.” App. 49a. After considering 
the evidence, including the corrected certification, the Board revoked Costino’s medical 
license. The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed.  
Costino’s criminal case then went to trial. After deliberating for less than two hours, 
the jury acquitted him on all counts.  
C. The malicious-prosecution suit 
Costino then brought malicious-prosecution claims against the officers, prosecutors, 
and local-government entities that took part in the investigation. He claimed that, in seeking 
the indictments, they had “concealed exculpatory evidence . . . knowingly procured and 
relied upon false certifications and testimony . . . and procured the alteration of evidence.” 
App. 188a. After discovery, Little Egg Harbor Township, Officer Anderson, and Detective 
Hallett moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted their motions. Costino 
now appeals.  
D. Jurisdiction and standard of review 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have jurisdiction 
under § 1291. We review de novo. Baloga v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist., 927 F.3d 742, 751 
(3d Cir. 2019). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to Costino, asking whether 
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for him. Id. at 749 n.1, 752. 
5 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT RIGHTLY DISMISSED THE MALICIOUS-PROSECUTION  
SUIT BECAUSE THE INVESTIGATORS HAD PROBABLE CAUSE 
A. Malicious prosecution and the presumption of probable cause 
To prove malicious prosecution, Costino must show: (1) Hallett and Anderson started 
a criminal proceeding against him; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in his favor; (3) they 
started the proceeding without probable cause; (4) they “acted maliciously or for a purpose 
other than bringing the plaintiff to justice”; and (5) he was deprived of liberty. Johnson v. 
Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 82 (3d Cir. 2007). Under prong three, a showing of probable cause is 
a complete defense. Goodwin v. Conway, 836 F.3d 321, 327 (3d Cir. 2016).  
Here, two grand juries found probable cause. In a malicious-prosecution suit, “a grand 
jury indictment . . . constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause.” Rose v. Bartle, 871 
F.2d 331, 353 (3d Cir. 1989). We call this the “presumption of probable cause.” Goodwin, 
836 F.3d at 329 n.35.  
Costino claims that this presumption does not apply because some of his claims arise 
from alleged pre-indictment misconduct. That may be true for false-arrest claims. See id. 
But malicious prosecution is different. See Johnson, 477 F.3d at 82 (collecting cases). 
Costino’s prosecution, unlike his arrest, was not complete until after the grand juries in-
dicted him. So the presumption of probable cause applies. 
Costino can rebut the presumption only by showing that the indictments resulted from 
“fraud, perjury or other corrupt means.” Rose, 871 F.2d at 353. To make that showing, 
Costino claims that Hallett and Anderson falsified evidence against him. But the record 
says otherwise.  
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B. Though Anderson and Hallett did omit some evidence, they did not  
fabricate it  
Costino claims that Anderson falsely denied seeking medical treatment for her spine. 
This information, Costino argues, would have shown that he prescribed Percocet lawfully 
to treat her pain, undercutting probable cause. He also argues that Hallett, in applying for 
a search warrant and testifying before the grand jury, failed to include a long list of alleg-
edly exculpatory evidence.  
Although evidence of Anderson’s chiropractic appointment was favorable, it does not 
undermine probable cause. First, failing to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence differs 
from affirmatively falsifying evidence. Investigators and prosecutors need not present ex-
culpatory evidence to grand juries. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 53 (1992). 
Second, Anderson signed the first, faulty certification after the second grand jury’s in-
dictment. So it could not have influenced either grand jury. And Costino concedes that “the 
factual record is devoid of any reference to whether . . . Anderson ever testified . . . before 
the [g]rand [j]ury.” Reply Br. 4. 
Third, Anderson’s certification does not negate the compelling inculpatory evidence 
that the investigators presented, such as Costino’s prescribing Percocets so that Anderson 
and the DEA agent could “unwind” and “relax[ ].” App. 76a, 244a. So even if the grand 
juries had known about Anderson’s chiropractic appointment, there was still more than 
enough evidence to support probable cause. Cf. Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786–87 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (requiring a plaintiff bringing a false-arrest claim to show that the false 
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statements in a warrant application were “material, or necessary, to the finding of probable 
cause” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
As for Hallett, we need not delve into the details of his alleged omissions. As discussed, 
the mere failure to disclose is not the same as maliciously falsifying evidence. In his grand-
jury testimony, Hallett did not have to disclose exculpatory evidence. Williams, 504 U.S. 
at 53. And in his warrant application, the alleged omissions were at worst careless, not 
malicious or reckless. In any event, they were immaterial. Even if “we excise the [alleged] 
inaccuracies and insert the [omitted] facts,” there was still more than enough evidence for 
probable cause. Wilson, 212 F.3d at 789. Indeed, Hallett did not testify before the second 
grand jury, yet it still indicted Costino.  
In short, these errors and omissions fall well short of fraud, perjury, or corruption. So 
Costino has not rebutted the presumption of probable cause.  
* * * * * 
Costino’s ultimate acquittal does not mean that the investigators lacked probable cause 
to pursue him. On the contrary, they had substantial incriminating evidence. And two grand 
juries found probable cause to indict. Even reading the record in his favor, Costino cannot 
show that these findings resulted from malicious or reckless misconduct. So his malicious-
prosecution claims fail, and we will affirm.  
